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While it is widely agreed that the allied coalition's defeat of Iraq was truly an outstanding display of military prowess, most military professionals acknowledge that the execution of this complex combat operation was far from perfect. It is imperative that we closely study the intelligence achievements and shortcomings of this combat operation in order to bring back more of Americas' sons and daughters in subsequent combat operations. 
ANALYSIS OF COALITION INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY CONTRIBUTIONS -THE UNITED STATES DOES NOT GO IT ALONE
A portion of the OPERATION DESERT SHIELD/STORM intelligence success can be directly attributed to the fact that U.S. intelligence, at all operational echelons, worked well with the allied coalition. The U.S. recognized early on that the Gulf War would be a true coalition effort and that the U.S. would simply not go it alone. 
ANALYSIS OF U.S. THEATER AND TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION CONTRIBUTIONS -HUMINT/CI, SIGINT AND IMINT
The Gulf War was truly an historic and ground-breaking event from a "strategic" versus "tactical" intelligence perspective. The distinction between the two levels of intelligence was blurred. In fact, they often overlapped. Battalion Task Force Intelligence Officers collected combat information and sent intelligence reports up the chain of command to be incorporated into Echelons Above Corps (EAC) Theater level intelligence products. 9 Conversely, there were instances where national intelligence agencies directly supported battalions with high quality, detailed intelligence reporting tailored for operational planning at the lowest levels.
U.S intelligence collection at the operational and tactical level of war was truly a multidisciplined approach, leveraging the strengths of Human Intelligence (HUMINT), Signals
Intelligence (SIGINT) and Imagery Intelligence (IMINT) disciplines to provide timely, accurate and relevant intelligence for the commander.
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE (CI)/HUMAN INTELLIGENCE (HUMINT)
HUMINT and CI played a vital role in the conduct of the Gulf War. A number of HUMINT/CI intelligence collection platforms were highly productive. Before we enter into a discussion of the various HUMINT/CI collection means, it is instructive to note that language proficiency and area expertise were two of the clearest challenges confronting the HUMINT/CI intelligence collection discipline during the Gulf War. 10 Intelligence professionals cannot begin to underscore the serious language challenge which confronted the intelligence community;
particularly with regard to low density language dialects such as Arabic Egyptian and Persian
Farsi. The Gulf War was a combat scenario where the U.S. military was forced to rely heavily on human intelligence. 11 The intelligence community was hard-pressed to produce competent linguists to serve as counterintelligence agents, interrogators, translators, voice intercept operators and liaison officers. It takes a great deal of time and training to produce these linguists and area experts. Senator David Boren (Democrat, Oklahoma) put it best when he stated, "during the Cold War, we focused our resources on the Soviet Union. Now, clearly we need to shift many of these resources to the Middle East in an effort to improve HUMINT."
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The Gulf War served to reinforce the importance of HUMINT/CI on the battlefield as well as the belief that there is no "quick fix" solution to this seemingly timeless challenge that confronts the intelligence community.
A great many HUMINT/CI lessons were harvested from the Gulf War. These high value HUMINT/CI enduring lessons can best be captured in four broad areas:
• Counterintelligence operations.
• Interrogation operations.
• Special Operations Forces and Long Range Surveillance Detachment operations.
• Every soldier on a battlefield is a HUMINT collector.
Counterintelligence Operations
The producing a great deal of precious warning and reporting with regard to SCUD missiles. While the SIGINT collection discipline received relatively high grades in the wake of the Gulf War, there was a common recognition that the system could be further improved. These enduring lessons can best be summed up in three broad categories:
• SIGINT organization and systems validation
• Quick Reaction Capability (QRC) strategies
• SIGINT capability as a deterrent
SIGINT Organization and Systems Validation
The 
Quick Reaction Capability (QRC) Strategies
The Gulf War presented a number of complex challenges to SIGINT professionals, paramount among them was the inability to collect every signal of interest on the battlefield.
Given the rapidly evolving nature of technological change, SIGINT professionals recognized the U.S. intelligence community was entering into a technological era where the acquisition of SIGINT collection systems would never keep pace with emerging technology. 23 Simply put, the five to seven year Department of Defense acquisition cycle could never keep pace with the stark reality of the Moore's Law dictum which posits technology doubles every 12 to 18 months. This enduring lesson led to more aggressive pursuit of research and development, coupled with commercial off the shelf acquisition policy, which was widely acknowledged within the SIGINT community as the road ahead in the SIGINT collection discipline.
SIGINT Capability as Deterrent
Despite the ambitious hopes and dreams of SIGINT professionals, the Gulf War was not the target rich environment they hoped for. This was due in large part to the Iraqi understanding of the U.S. SIGINT collection capability. Given that the Iraqis were keenly aware of U.S. military SIGINT collection capabilities, the Iraqis devised communications strategies to counter U.S.
SIGINT collection systems. For example, the Iraqis relied on hard-wire buried cable communications and messengers wherever possible because the Iraqis knew the U.S. was incapable of listening to these communications methods. This in turn grossly slowed down Iraqi communications and forced the Iraqis to cope with numerous command and control challenges. 24 The enduring lesson gleaned from this strange twist of events is that a mere capability can in fact be a deterrent. In essence, because our Iraqi adversary understood our robust SIGINT collection capability, he lost his flexibility to communicate freely on the battlefield.
What is more, discreetly advertising select intelligence collection capabilities may be an effective strategy to keep an adversary off balance by forcing him to cope with multiple dilemmas.
IMAGERY INTELLIGENCE (IMINT)
IMINT is a collection discipline that received a great deal of criticism during the Gulf War.
In the days following the Gulf War, Lieutenant General William C. Odom, a former director of the National Security Agency, abruptly stated, "the whole imagery intelligence area is broken."
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During OPERATION DESERT SHIELD/STORM most commanders demanded detailed imagery to support their operational planning; however this became a difficult order for the imagery community to fill. Because of the multiple challenges the IMINT community was forced to cope with, a number of enduring lessons emerged. These lessons served to "fix" the broken system
Lieutenant General Odom referred to as well as to frame the future of IMINT support to warfighters. The lessons are best summed up in four broad areas:
• The necessity for improved imagery reconnaissance capabilities at the tactical level.
• The need for broad area search/surveillance systems.
• A call for continued refinement of Bomb Damage Assessment (BDA) procedures.
Tactical Imagery Reconnaissance
The Unfortunately, these platforms relied on Vietnam era technology, resulting in considerable film processing lag, providing sub-optimal support to commanders with urgent operational requirements for imagery. 27 While these legacy platforms proved themselves marginally reliable, they were retired in the wake of the Gulf War. at finding large concentrations of Iraqi troops, especially when these formations were on the move. 32 Indeed, the Gulf War served as a reminder that the U.S. intelligence community needed to revive the wide area swath imagery collection capability to reverse our extant shortcoming, both air-breathers and non air-breathers.
Bomb Damage Assessment (BDA)
While there is a widely held perception that BDA was a serious shortcoming during the Gulf War, some disagree. Granted, BDA was not always completely accurate or timely, but,
given the long litany of mitigating circumstances, some may argue that the individuals involved with BDA can be justly proud of their mission accomplishment while simultaneously paving a way ahead based on their lessons learned.
During the early stages of planning for OPERATION DESERT SHIELD/STORM, the Department of Defense (DoD) intelligence community agreed that there would be a division of BDA responsibilities; however, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) refused to participate in the DoD managed BDA system. 33 This led to a duplication of some efforts and a more competitive analytical environment (between DoD and CIA). One might argue that this is not a bad news story. In fact, many intelligence professionals would agree that competitive intelligence analysis can be quite healthy.
A number of BDA problems were caused by events which were simply not in the hands of BDA technicians. For example, fighter/bomber aircraft sorties greatly outpaced imagery collection in support of BDA. That is to say, IMINT platforms dedicated to BDA collection could not keep up with the fast-paced operational tempo of the air campaign. Furthermore, many of the BDA imagery collection platforms were ineffective due to inclement weather.
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Within the intelligence community, there was a great deal of bureaucratic in-fighting regarding whether BDA imagery overflights had a higher priority than area coverage imagery overflights. This competition led to dedicated BDA imagery coverage to ensure this critical collection focus was not pushed aside in favor of constantly emerging requirements.
There was also a tremendous amount of confusion created by the outdated and constantly changing BDA criterion. This was compounded by the very limited BDA analytical expertise, across the intelligence community, in dealing with new munitions, e.g., "smart bombs." This analytical shortcoming precipitated a call for more formalized BDA training for imagery analysts across the Department of Defense.
35

ANALYSIS OF U.S. THEATER AND TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS CONTRIBUTIONS -KNOW THE ENEMY
OPERATION DESERT SHIELD/STORM presented U.S. intelligence analysts, at all operational echelons, with great challenges. Subsequent to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, most
Intelligence analysts were first introduced to an Iraqi threat they had little previous experience with. From the onset of OPERATION DESERT SHIELD, Intelligence analysts labored arduously to develop the enemy situation and make sense of the complex Iraqi problem set for their respective commanders. 36 Once U.S. military forces were committed to combat operations, intelligence analysts were forced to cope with a rapidly changing environment to provide their commanders with timely, relevant and accurate intelligence reporting. Moreover, intelligence analysts were further challenged to share intelligence with subordinate, adjacent and higher headquarters so that warfighting commanders could achieve some semblance of common situational awareness. Like intelligence collection operations, intelligence analysis had its share of noteworthy achievements and shortcomings. Enduring lessons with respect to intelligence analysis emerged in the broad areas of:
• Joint Intelligence Centers (JICs).
• Tactical intelligence analysis.
• Intelligence analyst training.
JOINT 
OPERATIONAL AND TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS
When one examines intelligence analysis at operational and tactical echelons, perhaps the greatest Gulf War challenge confronting intelligence analysts was the development of common situational awareness, sometimes referred to as a common operating picture. Gulf
War intelligence analysts relied exclusively on a number of slow and inaccurate analog tools, such as voice radio communications and plastic overlays, to disseminate and share intelligence 40 in the dawn of an era of warfare which demanded digital solutions to disseminate and share data on the battlefield in near real time. It was precisely this type of Gulf War challenge that precipitated the requirement for automated battlefield command tools in support of tactical intelligence analysis.
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INTELLIGENCE ANALYST TRAINING
The Gulf War served to validate the rigor of U.S. military intelligence analyst training as well as to push our training system to train the intelligence analyst of tomorrow. Unit after action reviews are replete with examples of young intelligence analysts rising to the occasion to perform unprecedented levels of support to maneuver commanders and planning staffs at all levels. 42 OPERATIONS DESERT SHIELD/STORM confirmed that the U.S. military is in fact recruiting and retaining some remarkably bright and capable young soldiers into our intelligence formations. The Gulf War additionally underscored a challenge to examine fundamentally different ways to train intelligence analysts so they could be more effective in a future era of modern warfare characterized by vast amounts of data flowing throughout the battlefield at a cadence the world could never predict. 34 The air campaign and subsequent ground war kicked off during the "shamal" season in which visibility was extremely limited due to high winds and sandstorms. 35 BDA analysis was not taught at DoD imagery analysis courses prior to the Gulf War. 36 The challenges confronting intelligence analysts was further compounded by the fact that analysts at all levels commonly disagreed over enemy composition, strength and disposition. 37 Currently called the National Joint Military Intelligence Center. 38 The DoD JIC was located in the Pentagon's National Military Intelligence Center and the OICC was located in the Defense Intelligence Agency Center at Bolling Air Force Base, Washington, D.C. 39 In the wake of the Gulf War, JICs stood up at all nine of the Combatant Commands. 42 While this discussion is centered on the role of intelligence analysts, it must be noted that terrain analysts proved themselves equally noteworthy during OPERATION DESERT STORM. The terrain assessments produced by U.S. Army Engineers were critical planning tools during the Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) staff planning process. 43 Richter, 3. 44 The collection versus TPED debate still rages today in the resource war of the Pentagon. 45 Automated exploitation capabilities such as Automatic Target Recognition (ATR) and communications networks such as the Joint WorldWide Intelligence Communications System (JWICS) were developed in the wake of the Gulf War.
